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Abstract: This paper follows Gely and Spiller (1989a) in modeling the Supreme Court
as a self-interested, ideologically motivated actor, making decisions subject to the
constraints imposed by the other political institutions of government, namely, the two
houses of Congress and the President. We apply this framework to analyze the
political rationales behind two major recent Supreme Court decisions, the State Farm
and Grove City decisions. We show that both decisions can be understood as the Court
reacting strategically to changes in the relevant political constraints reflecting
changes in both Congress and the Presidency.
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I. Introduction
The role of the Supreme Court in the design of public policy has attracted much
academic attention. The current debate on the role of the institutions of our
political system, in particular that of the Supreme Court, has been basically
normative. 1 Particular attention has been given to the normative properties of
different institutional arrangements, for example, whether the Supreme Court should
follow a restrained or activist policy. whether any of those institutional
arrangements would actually be carried out by self-interested agents, however, has not
been analyzed.
In Gely and Spiller (1989a) we propose a rational choice theory of the Supreme
Court. There we model the Supreme Court as a self-interested, ideologically motivated
institution, making its decisions subject not to the traditional legal rules of
precedent, but to the constraints arising from the political interests of the other
institutions of government, namely Congress and the President. While we do not
believe that this is a realistic description of the actual workings of the Supreme
Court, our model provides a simple positive framework that is rich enough to analyze,
and forecast, changes over time in the behavior of the Court, and in the determinants
of public policy. In this paper we expand that framework to study the interaction
between the Supreme Court and executive agencies. We also apply that approach to the
analysis of two recent Supreme Court statutory decisions, the State Farm , and Grove
1 There has been a long-standing debate about whether the Court must follow an
"activist" or "restrained" path. See, for example, Forte (1972), Halpern and Lamb
(1982). Recent surveys of the different approaches to the analysis of the Supreme
Court are Rohde and Spaeth (1976), Sheldon (1974), Halpern and Lamb (1982) and Wasby
(1988). Among the classic positive approaches to the Supreme Court is that of Dahl
(1957), who claims that, because of their recruitment, the Justices are a reflection
of the electorate, and they play a "legitimizing" role. Dahl's hypothesis was later
expanded by Funston (1975) to reconcile short term disagreements between the Court and
Congress. See also Handberg and Hill (1980) and (1984) for a similar interpretation.
An alternative view of the Supreme Court is provided in Adamany (1973), who claims
that the Court constitute a force for instability. See, also Casper (1976).
City decisions. We show that both Supreme Court decisions can be understood as the
Court reacting strategically to changes in the relevant political constraints
reflecting the changes in both Congress and the Presidency, and not necessarily to
legal precedent or to Congressional intent.
II. The Theory*
We develop here a simple model of Supreme Court-Congress-President relationship
We focus on statutory rather than Constitutional issues. Elsewhere we expand this
framework to the analysis of Constitutional interpretations. 3
Our analysis is based on several simplifying assumptions concerning our four
players: the House, the Senate, the President and the Supreme Court.'1 Our first set
of assumptions concerns preferences. In particular, we assume that all four players
have well specified and stable preferences over the policy space (R2 ) . Furthermore,
those preferences are assumed to be represented by strictly convex iso-preference
contours (in particular, without loss of generality, we will assume they to be
circular). Thus, each actor has an ideal point in R2 . 5 We call H,S,P and SC the
2 This section is based on Gely and Spiller (1989a) , and hence it is only
sketched here.
3 Gely and Spiller (1989b).
* See Gely and Spiller (1989a) for a more detailed treatment of our basic
framework.
Our preference assumptions imply that our three collective bodies, the House,
the Senate and the Court can each be represented as if it was composed by a single
individual. These are simplifying assumptions that are based on the role of several
institutions in Congress. In particular, the role of committees, of agenda setting,
and of the assignment process, discounts the preferences of most Congressmen in favor
of those of the relevant Committee members and in particular that of their chairs.
Thus, in a sense, the preferences we call those of the House or the Senate reflect
more those of the chairpersons of the relevant committees in the different houses of
Congress. Also, while members of the Court are not elected and thus are not under
direct constituency pressure, they are appointed by elected officials who do feel that
pressure. Further, political considerations form part of the appointment process,
making it important to consider the political preferences of the justices. Thus, it
is reasonable to assume that, in the absence of changes in its composition, the
ideal points of the House, the Senate, the President and the Supreme Court
respectively.
For every two players, we can define a contract curve in the policy space. A
point in the policy space belongs to the contract curve between these two players, if
a deviation from that point implies a reduction in the utility level of at least one
of the players. Thus, a contract curve represents all those points in the policy
space that the players could reach if they would bargain in isolation. We represent
the contract curve between two agents i,j as C(I,J).
We focus on policy-making. Policy can be made by a specific legislative act, by
the actions of an administrative agency (that is, a Presidential policy), or by a
Supreme Court decision. We assume that the role of the Supreme Court decisions is to
determine reversal policy points. That is, to define a policy that would take effect
unless the House and the Senate reach an alternative arrangement. Thus, Congress can
reverse a Supreme Court decision, but the President cannot. Similarly, Congress and
the Supreme Court can reverse an administrative policy. However, for Congress to
reverse it, both the House and the Senate must agree on an alternative policy. The
Supreme Court, on the other hand does not need Congress to reverse a Presidential
policy action. The role of the President, in our model, is to interpret and implement
Congressional decisions through the administrative agencies. We assume that the
President does not have the ability to veto Congressional actions. 6 The President,
though, is subject to being overruled by both Congress and the Courts.
Long Run Political Equilibria
Consider a simple bargaining game among the House, the Senate, the President and
Supreme Court has stable preferences over the policy space.
6 See Gely and Spiller (1989a) for further discussion of the role of the
Presidential veto.
the Supreme Court, where the Supreme Court determines the reversal policy outcome.
Following Gely and Spiller (1989a), we first define the set of "feasible political
equilibria." A feasible political equilibrium is a feasible bargaining outcome.
Since any point in the House-Senate contract curve C(H,S) is preferred by both the
House and the Senate to any point outside it, the President cannot administratively
implement any policy outside C(H,S). Similarly, the Supreme Court cannot force a
policy outcome outside C(H,S). To see that, consider a point outside the contract
curve. The House and the Senate can agree on a point on the contract curve that will
make them better off. Further action by the Supreme Court implying a reversal point
outside the contract curve will trigger renewed Congressional bargaining, ending in a
legislative outcome, again on the contract curve C(H,S). 7 Thus, feasible political
equilibria are only those points in the House -Senate contract curve, that is, those
points such that no other legislative outcomes would make both the Senate and the
House better off. See Figure 1. While the President is not able to sustain a veto, 8
it may play a substantial role in determining the final equilibrium outcome in the
absence of Supreme Court scrutinity.
From the set of feasible legislative equilibria, a "long run political
equilibrium" should develop. Long run political equilibria are all feasible
legislative outcomes such that no alternative policies could make the Supreme Court
If the Supreme Court would try to impose its ideal point SC as the policy
outcome, it will face a reversal by Congress. If the Supreme Court tries, after being
reversed, to again impose its ideal point as the policy outcome, both houses of
Congress will support a constitutional amendment to further limit the power of the
Court. Observe, however, that if the Supreme Court's decision changes the status-quo
from one point to another, both in the contract curve, no constitutional conflict
would arise since one house of Congress is necessarily made better off by the Supreme
Court move. See Washy (1988) and Casper (1976) for discussions of the constitutional
implications of a "ruling-response-ruling-response" sequence.
And thus, it is not able to bring legislative outcomes outside the contract
curve C(H,S)
.
better off. Formally, X* is a long run equilibrium if no other point in the contract
curve would make the Supreme Court better off (E2 in Figure 1). That is, for an
outcome to be a long run political equilibrium no other point on the contract curve
could make the Supreme Court better off. Consider, for example, a case where the
status quo is on the contract curve but the Supreme Court could be made better off by
an alternative policy closer to, say, the ideal point of the House. Then, the Supreme
Court by properly selecting a series of cases can change the reversal point so that
bargaining between the House and the Senate brings the Court's most preferred point on
the contract curve as the legislative policy outcome. At that point the political
process ends, since bargaining among the House and the Senate cannot make both houses
better off.
Let us start by considering a case where neither the Supreme Court nor the
President may have substantial influence on legislative outcomes, that is, when the
ideal points of both the House and the Senate are the same. Then, the long run
equilibrium is represented by their ideal point (E
x ) , as in Figure 2. Figure 2 also
depicts the positions of the President (P
x
) and of the Supreme Court (SC) . Assume now
that as the result of elections, the Senate changed drastically, with its new ideal
point closer to that of the President. In the absence of any Supreme Court action,
the House will block any new legislation which will change the status quo away from
Ej. Observe, however, that now the President can alter the implementation of the
legislation. A policy point like R
x
leaves the Senate indifferent between the legal
status quo (E
x
) and the actual implementation (R
x ) . The President, however, is much
better off at R
x
. Such policy, like R
x
,
will be undertaken by an executive agency
with the Senate blocking any legislative move against it. 9 The Senate, however, could
9 The agency, however, may still face problems with Congress if the committee
that oversees it does not support its policies. While the committee may not be able
to force the agency to reverse its policy, it may try to influence the agency through
6
offer the House to legislate S 2 as the legal standard. Such a policy would be
preferred by the House to, say, R
x
,
or to any other point in the contract curve
between the President and the Senate. Thus, S 2 becomes the legal standard.
10 The
introduction of the President, then, shifted the equilibrium from E
:
to S 2 . In the
absence of the President, E1 would have remained the equilibrium. That is, in the
absence of the Supreme Court, the President would have a strong impact on public
policy.
Let us now introduce the Supreme Court. In Figure 2, the position of the Supreme
Court has improved following the elections, since there are points along the new
contract curve between the House and the Senate which provide it with a utility level
above that of E 1 . The Supreme Court is, in this case, worse off at R x than at E x .
Furthermore, given the new location of the Senate, the Supreme Court's best choice is
a point like E2 , on the new contract curve between the House and the Senate. Thus,
the Supreme Court, here, will act as restoring some stability to policy making. This
stability was lost because of the President's ability to side with one of the houses
of Congress in implementing the legislation.
Thus, E2 becomes the equilibrium independent of the ideal point of the President.
In other words, in our model, the presence of the Supreme Court reduces the
discretionary power of the President. There is a role, however, that the president
can play and it is to appoint justices to the court. To the extent that the President
can appoint justices with similar preferences to his own, then, the President may have
a lasting impact on public policy. His long run impact, however, may substantially
different ways. Budgetary decisions as well as oversight activities may substantially
disturb the agency's operations. See Spiller (1988), and references therein.
In general, in the absence of the Supreme Court, then, the long run political
equilibrium is characterized as that point in C(H,S) that maximizes the President's
utility. Formally, NSX* - {X/X - Argmax Up (x)
,
s.t. x G C(H,S)}, with the superscript
NS representing the absence of the Supreme Court.
exceed his impact on the current public policy. 11,12
Comparative Statics
The model just described can be used to understand changes in the position of the
Supreme Court, even in the absence of changes in its composition. Consider, for
example, an initial long run equilibrium, E lt where the House and the Senate are as
depicted in Figure 3. Let there now the results of an election imply a large change
in the composition of the House, so that it now would like to see, say, a stricter
enforcement of federal regulations. Since the Senate has not changed, any new
legislative equilibrium (in the absence of any Supreme Court ruling), should reside in
the new contract curve between the House and the Senate (C(H2 ,S 1 )), and in particular
in the bargaining area defined by E 1 . The fact that the Senate did not change
restricts the extent of policy change that can develop in the absence of Supreme Court
intervention. Figure 3 shows, for example, that the new long run equilibrium may well
be outside that area, with the new long run equilibrium, E2 , closer to the new ideal
point of the House. Thus, the Supreme Court will usually follow the voters. 13
It is worth now summarizing some of the main empirical implications of our
framework concerning case selection and the rendering of statutory opinions by the
Court. In particular, the probability that the Court will select a case depends on
whether or not Congress experienced recent changes in its preferences in relation to
11 It is then not surprising, that current commentators see the appointments to
the Supreme Court, more than any of his domestic policy choices, the main legacy of
former President Reagan.
12 We do not analyze here the role of the veto, since we are assuming homogenous
houses of Congress. Thus, the President will not be able to block any legislative
agreement between the House and the Senate. Elsewhere, Gely and Spiller (1989a), also
model the impact of the Presidential veto in the presence of the Supreme Court.
13 See, however, Gely and Spiller (1989a) for qualifications to this statement.
that issue. 1 * In that case, the contract curve facing the Supreme Court has shifted,
opening an opportunity for changing the status quo. Similar reasoning suggests that
changes in the opinions of the Court will follow changes in the composition of
Congress, its committees, and the preferences of the President.
In the following sections we apply the framework developed above to analyze two
Supreme Court cases, and compare its main empirical implications with developments in
Congress and the Presidency.
III. The State Farm Case.
This case is an example of the Court reducing the ability of the President to affect
policy through administrative agencies.
Involved in this case is the extent of the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA) authority to rescind a previously issued standard. On June 24,
1983, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association




15 The Court held that the NHTSA' s rescission of the passive restraint
requirement in Modified Standard 208 (requiring the installation of passive restraints
in new vehicles), was arbitrary and capricious. The agency, according to the Court,
failed to present an adequate basis and explanation for rescinding the requirement and
had to either consider the matter further or adhere to or amend the Standard along the
lines which its analysis supports. 16
Let us first discuss the events that preceded the State Farm decision. In 1966
Congress enacted the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Act (1966 Act), with the
14 In particular, whether the chairs and members of the relevant committees have
changed.
15 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
16 Id. p. 34.
purpose of reducing "traffic accidents and deaths and injuries to persons resulting
from traffic accidents." 17 The Act directs the Secretary of Transportation or his
delegate to issue motor safety standards that "shall be practicable, shall meet the
need for motor safety, and shall be stated in objective terms." 18 The Secretary of
Transportation delegated this authority to the NHTSA.
Under the authority of the Act, the Department of Transportation issued, in 1967,
Standard 208, which at that time simply required the installation of seatbelts in all
automobiles. 19 Having noticed a low level of seatbelt usage, the Department started
to consider the possibility of requiring "passive occupant restraint systems." After
some discussion, the Department revised Standard 208 to include passive protection
requirements. 20 Two years later, in 1972, the agency amended the Standard to require
full passive protection for all front seat occupants of vehicles manufactured after
August 15, 1975. The two types of passive restraints considered were automatic
seatbelts and airbags . Vehicles built between August 1973 and August 1975 were to
carry either passive restraints or lap and shoulder belts coupled with an "ignition
interlock" that would prevent starting the vehicle if the belts were not connected.
The ignition interlock option proved to be very unpopular and Congress in 1974
amended the Act to prohibit a motor vehicle safety standard from requiring or
permitting compliance by means of an ignition interlock or a continuous buzzer
17 15 U.S.C. S. 1381
18 In issuing these standards, the Secretary or his delegate is directed to
consider "relevant available motor vehicle safety data," whether the proposed standard
is "reasonable, practicable and appropriate" for the particular type of motor vehicle
for which it is prescribed, and "the extent to which such standards will contribute to
carrying out the purposes of the Act." 15 U.S.C. Sl392(a), (1976 ed. Supp. V), and 15
U.S.C. S1392(f)(l),(3),(4).
19 32 Fed. Reg. 2415.
20 34 Fed. Reg. 11,148 (July 2, 1969).
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designated to indicate that safety belts were not in use. The 1974 amendments also
provided veto power to Congress for any safety standard that could be satisfied by a
system other that seatbelts. 21
In 1976, the Secretary of Transportation, suspended the passive restraint
requirement, arguing that there would be widespread resistance to the new system. 22
Months later, however, a new Secretary issued, in 1977, a new mandatory passive
restraint regulation, known as Modified Standard 208. 23 As modified, the Standard
required the installation of airbags or passive seatbelts. During the following three
years, Modified standard 208 survived both judicial and Congressional scrutinity. 2*
With the Reagan administration coming to power, a new perspective on regulatory
reform was introduced. A central concern of the administration was the simplification
of administrative rules implementing regulatory statutes. One of the administration's
21 Motor Vehicle and School bus Safety Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. 93-492, S109,
88 Stat. 1482, 15U.S.C, S 1410(b), and S1410(B)(2).
22 Rule-making opening reported at 41 Fed. Reg. 24,070 (June 14, 1976). Final
decision reported at Department of Transportation, The Secretary's Decision Concerning
Motor Vehicle Occupant Crash Protection (Dec. 6, 1976) (Coleman decision) Joint
Appendix (J. A.) 2065.
23 42 Fed. Reg. 34289 (1987); 49 C.F.R. S571-208 (1978).
2A For example, in Pacific Legal Foundation v. Department of Transportation , the
Court of Appeals upheld Modified Standard 208 as rational, non-arbitrary regulation
consistent with the agency's mandate under the Act. (193 U.S. App . D.C. 184, 593
F.2d. 1338, cert, denied. 444 U.S. 830 (1979).) The Supreme Court denied certiorari
of the Court's of Appeal's decision. Similarly, the Modified Standard also survived
congressional scrutinity. Congress failed to exercise its authority under the
legislative veto provision of the 1974 Amendments. While no action was taken by the
full House of Representatives, the Senate Committee with jurisdiction over NHTSA
affirmatively endorsed the Standard. (S. Rep. No. 95-481 (1977).) Several others
rulings dealing with Modified Standard 208 were considered during the next several
years. For example, on May 22, 1978 a notice of proposed rule-making was issued in
response to a petition from General Motors requesting some more flexibility in the
design of emergency release mechanisms for automatic seatbelts. (43 Fed. Reg. 21,912
(May 22, 1978).) NHTSA granted the proposal six months later. (43 Fed. Reg. 52,493
(Nov. 13, 1978).)
11
major efforts was directed to the rescission of the passive restraint standard. 25 It
was apparent that the House of Representatives, which remained dominated by Democrats,
would not go along with the President's intent. Facing such opposition, the
Administration started to implement policy changes through the administrative route. 26
The Reagan administration, then, announced a one year delay in the implementation
of NHTSA's passive restraint standard. In February 1981, Secretary of Transportation
Andrew Lewis reopened the rule-making and argued that a one year delay was necessary
because of the "dramatic changes in the production plans for the 1982 model fleet,"
and because, "the economic and other justifications for the existing phase- in
scheduling have changed dramatically since the standard was adopted in 1977.
"
27 The
delay was also needed, Lewis argued, to allow NHTSA officials time to reexamine the
entire passive restraint issue. As part of his proposal, however, Lewis prepared
three alternative amendments to the rule: (1) reversing the order of compliance, so
that small cars were to be equipped first, (2) requiring all cars to comply with the
standards by March, 1983, or, (3) rescinding the standard altogether. 28
Shortly thereafter, the NHTSA issued a final rule (Notice 25), rescinding the
passive restraint requirement as contained in Modified Standard 208. In explaining
the rescission, NHTSA maintained that it was not longer able to find, as it had when
the Standard was issued, that the automatic restraint requirement would produce
significant safety benefits. 29
25 See, for example, Thomas, Wildemann and Brown (1987), p. 31.
26 Id.
27 46 Fed. Reg. 53,420 (1981).
28 Thomas, Wildemann and Brown, (1987).
29 In addition, given the low benefit-cost ratio arising from the analysis of
this requirement, NHTSA feared that many consumers would regard Modified Standard 208
as an instance of ineffective regulation. (46 Fed. Reg. 53,419 (Oct. 29, 1981).)
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In holding that the rescission of modified Standard 208 was arbitrary and
capricious, the Supreme Court noted that the rescission of a standard must pass the
same degree of scrutinity by the judiciary as would the enactment of new regulation.
The Court found that NHTSA had failed to present adequate basis and explanation for
rescinding the requirement, and ordered it to consider the matter further or to adhere
to or amend the Standard along the line which its analysis supported previously.
Before the Supreme Court decision, however, there was uncertainty whether the
administrative elimination of a regulation should be held to the same standards as
their introduction. Thus, the Supreme Court decision did not simply imply the
application of a standard precedent rule. State Farm did open new legal grounds. 30
Thus, it is worth investigating whether there is a political economy rationale for the
decision.
Figure 4 is a graphical description of these events as they would be interpreted
by the model in this paper. We first identify the dimension or issues involved in the
case. In State Farm the Court confronted two issues. The issue of immediate
attention was the validity of Modified Standard 208, and thus the extent of safety
regulation in the automobile industry. A different issue was the extent by which the
President can deregulate via administrative rules without the consent of other
branches
.
Having defined the dimensions we need next to define the relevant ideal points
for the President, Congress and the Supreme Court. The President position is not
difficult to locate, since President Reagan was very vocal about his preferences. The
new Administration's preferences called for a substantial reduction in safety
regulation, and also for administrative deregulatory power.
The House and the Senate's preferences, before 1980, were on the other direction.
30 Garland (1985) .
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We focus on the chairmen of the committees with jurisdiction over motor vehicle
safety. In the Senate, the relevant committee was the Commerce Committee (later to be
named the Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee). From 1966 to 1979, the
committee was controlled by Democrats. Up to 1976 the chairman was Senator Magnuson
(D. Wash.). As revealed by bills Senator Magnuson introduced during his tenure in
Congress, he was in favor of extensive government safety regulation. 31 The
preferences of the rest of the members of the Senate are expected to be at least in
the same direction as those of Senator Magnuson.
In 1981, however, there was a change in the dominating preferences in the
Senate. The new chairman of the Commerce Committee, Senator Packwood (Rep. Oregon),
showed different preferences. By analyzing some of his legislative efforts during
this period, we can see that Packwood supported more federal deregulation and, to some
extent, less safety regulation than his predecessors. 32
In the House we have that the committee with jurisdiction over the relevant issue
was the committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. From 1966 to 1980, R. Staggers
(D. W.Va.) acted as committee chairman. In 1981, however, the jurisdiction over motor
vehicles safety was given to the committee on Energy and Commerce, under the
chairmanship of R. Dingell (D. Michigan). Both, Dingell and Staggers, were supporters
of government safety regulation. 33 Thus as depicted in Figure 4, the preferences of
the House, both before and after 1980, are for less federal deregulation and more
31 For example, S. 1883 (1976) (directing the Secretary of Transportation to
issue standards for fuel economy performance); S 1302 (1976) (to promote safety and
health in the mining industry)
.
32 S 2038, for example, introduced in the 98th Congress, provided for the
deregulation of the trucking industry.
3 For example, H 14,256 (96th Congress) provided for an increase in consumer
protection in relation to drugs and cosmetics. Similarly, H 4175 (95th Congress)
provided for an extensive use of seatbelts.
14
extensive safety regulatory provisions than the Senate. 34 The contract curve
connecting H and S represents the political configuration pre-1980, with E
representing the Modified Standard 208. Following the 1980 election there is a new
contract curve, with the Senate moving away from the House. The main change in the
Senate's ideal point (and thus in the contract curve), is along the Federal
Deregulation dimension. 35 Similarly, the new President moves with the Senate. For
simplicity, we assume that the ideal points of the Senate and the President are the
same. The change in the political configuration undermines the long run equilibrium
nature of the status quo. In the short run, however, before the Supreme Court acts,
the President can try to "pull" the policy outcome towards his ideal point, even
though the House will block any detrimental change to the current legislation. The
opening of the rule-making by Secretary Lewis in 1981, and the rescission of Modified
Standard 208, can be interpreted in this way. (P 1 ,S 1 ) in Figure 4, represents the
NHTSA's ruling. Since at S
x
the Senate is at its ideal point, it will block any new
legislation which may alter the NHTSA's position. 36
Several bills were introduced in Congress shortly after the February 1981
announcement and before the State Farm decision. As expected by our framework,
however, none of those legislative initiatives were acted upon. (See the Appendix).
The NHTSA's decision, then, allowed the Senate to achieve an outcome close to its
ideal point without having to get directly involved in the enactment of legislation.
Since less populated states have a relatively larger representation in the
Senate than in the House, it is reasonable to predict that the Senate will usually be
less responsive to regulatory measures than the House. See, McCubbins, et al (1989).
Thus, we should expect the main change in the long run equilibrium to be
along that dimension as well.
Furthermore, since the NHTSA's ruling may backfire in the public opinion
eyes, pressing for legislation supporting the Administration's view, may be
politically costly. Thus, we would not expect the Senate to promote new legislation
to make the NHTSA position part of the legal standard.
15
At the time of the State Farm decision, then, the situation can be described as
follows: an agency decision has modified the status quo, and has tilted the balance of
power in favor of the Senate, creating a stalemate in legislative action. It is at
this point that we would expect the Supreme Court to, opportunistically, enter a
decision to restore a policy closer to the previous status quo. R lf in Figure 4,
represents the State Farm case. R
x
is more attune with what the status quo was before
1980, since it moves the status quo away from S
x
towards H .
In deciding whether the NHTSA's rescission of the passive standard requirement
was proper, the Court had to determine first what standard of review to apply in
general to administrative rulings. 37 As mentioned above, the Court held that a
rescission of a rule is subject to the same standard of judicial review, "the
arbitrary and capricious standard", as is the promulgation of a new rule. Garland
(1985) argues that the Court's ruling endorsed both the quasi-procedural, as well as
the substantive elements of the "hard look" doctrine of judicial review of agency's
decisions. This doctrine places renewed emphasis on ensuring agency fidelity to
congressional purpose. Since the NHTSA failed to supply a reasoned analysis justifying
the change in policy, it did not satisfy the quasi-procedural elements of the
doctrine. 38
Because of its precedent value, the State Farm decision can be understood as an
attempt by the Court to restrict the extent of interference by other agencies in the
process of regulatory legislation.
37 Garland (1985), pp. 542-548
38 Furthermore, the agency seems to have also violated the substantive elements
of the doctrine in at least two respects: (1) lack of records in support of its
findings of fact; and (2) failing to establish a reasonable relationship between its
decision on the one hand, and the relevant evidence, alternatives, and statutory
purpose, on the other. Garland (1985 p. 546).
16
V. Grove City v. Bell 39
The Supreme Court decision in Grove City , on February 28, 1984, involves the power of
the Department of Education under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972. 40 The
1972 amendments prohibit employment discrimination on the basis of sex in educational
institutions receiving federal funds. The issue at hand is the determination of the
appropriate scope of the Department of Education's enforcement powers under Title IX.
The two sections relevant here are sections 901 and 902. Section 901 prohibits
discrimination on the basis of sex by any education program or activity receiving
federal assistance. Section 902, the enforcement provision for Section 901, provides
in its pertinent parts that compliance may be effected by, among other alternatives,
"the termination of or refusal to grant or to continue assistance under such program
or activity to any recipient
. .
.
, but such termination or refusal shall be limited in
its effect to the particular program, or part thereof, in which noncompliance has been
so found."'' 1
The plain language of Section 902 appears to indicate a program-specific type of
enforcement. However, there has been extensive debate on the meaning of Section 902.
Marks (1987) argues that an examination of the legislative history of the Act points
towards the conclusion that an institution-wide type of enforcement provision was
intended. It has also been forcefully argued, however, that a program-specific
enforcement provision is more truthful to congressional intent. Garvey (1986),
examines the language of several antidiscrimination statutes which used language
similar to that of Title IX. He concludes that the current language of Title VI of
465 U.S. 555 (1984). For a political economy analysis of this case, see
Marks (1987).
In 1972 the Higher Education Act was enacted into law as the Education
Amendments of 1972. Pub. L. 92-318, Title IX, S 902, 86 Stat. 373, 20 U.S.C. S 1682
41 Id.
17
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title IX, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
and the Age Discrimination Act of 1975, supports a program-specific enforcement
provision. Each of the statutes begin with a prohibition against discrimination in
any "program or activity receiving Federal financial aid" and then proceed to make
clear that the phrase "program or activity" means something less than "recipient"
,
"educational institution," or "political entity".
Not only has there been debate at the congressional level on the meaning of
Section 902, but courts have struggled with the issue as well. Several federal courts
have decided in favor of an institution-wide enforcement provision. One such example
is Haffer v. University , involving an athletic program which did not receive earmarked
funds covered under Title IX. A2 Several other cases have followed the same approach
when deciding the appropriate enforcement type for other antidiscrimination
statutes.* 3 On the other hand several other courts have interpreted the enforcement
provisions of antidiscrimination statutes as program-specif ic
.
AA
42 524 F. Supp. 531(E.D. Pa. 1981), affirmed 688 F. 2d. 14 (3rd Cir.1982)
43 As to Section 504: Wolff v. South Colonie School District . 534 F. Supp. 758
(N.D.N.Y. 1982) (school trips covered). As to Title VI: Board of Public Instruction
of Taylor Co. v. Finch . 414 F. 2d. 1068 (5th Cir.1969) (assumes institutional-wide
coverage); United States v. Jefferson Co. Board of Education . 372 F.2d. 836 (5th
Cir.1966), affirmed en banc, 380 F. 2d. 385, cert, denied subnom: Caddo Parrish Board of
Education v. United States . 389 U.S. 840 (1967) (Title VI institution-wide
desegregation order appropriate)
.
** For example, Hillsdale College v. Department of Health. Education and
Welfare
.
696 F. 2d. 418 (6th Cir. 1982) (the entire college as an institution was not a
"program within the meaning of Title IX), vacated and remanded, 466 U.S. 901 (1984);
Rice v. President & Fellows of Harvard College . 663 F.2d. 336 (1st Cir. 1981)
(allegation that the law school at the college in question received federal funds for
its work study program, without allegation of sex discrimination in school's handling
of that program, was insufficient to invoke the protection of the Education Amendments
of 1972); Dougherty County School Svs . v. Harris . 622 F.2d 735 (5th Cir. 1980) (Title
IX does not authorize Secretary to terminate all federal aid because of any
discrimination in a school system if the federally assisted programs are administered
impeccably) ; Romeo Community Schools v. Unites States Department of Health. Education,
and Welfare
. 600 F.2d 581 (6th Cir. 1979) (Title IX applies only to students involved
in programs or activities receiving federal financial assistance and does not apply
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Notwithstanding this debate over the interpretation of the enforcement provision,
the preferences of the committees with jurisdiction over this issue in both houses can
be clearly defined. Marks (1987) shows that up to 1980 the House committee on
Education and Labor had stable preferences. The average mean ADA score of democrats
was relatively high (a liberal vote on the issue of enforcement is one in favor of
institution-wide coverage).* 5 During this same period similar tendencies dominated
the Senate committee on Labor and Human Resources. Not only did a democratic majority
controlled the committee, but in addition the ranking minority member of the
committee, Republican Jacob Javits, was a principal sponsor of the original
legislation and a supporter of institution-wide termination. A6
Thus, until 1980 the status quo could be understood as requiring institution-wide
enforcement. E in Figure 5 represents this policy outcome. We assume that until
1980 the ideal points of both houses of Congress were very close in the policy space,
supporting both institution-wide enforcement. E is assumed to be on the contract
curve C(H,S ), where H and S represent the House and Senate ideal points. E is also
assumed to represent the initial long run equilibrium.
In 1980 a change in the political composition of Congress opened the opportunity
for the Supreme Court to strategically alter the status quo. Although the House
Committee in Education and Labor continued to be controlled by democrats (thus we keep
the ideal point of the House at H) , the Senate experienced a large change. A
republican majority now dominates the Committee on Labor and Human Resources, with the
consequent change in committee preferences. Marks (1987) shows that the mean ADA
additionally to employees of educational institutions receiving such assistance)
,
cert, der.ied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979).
Marks (1987) also analyzes the length of continuous service to show the
importance of these legislators.
46 Id at p. 25.
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legislative scores for the Senate committee under republican domination was lower than
the committee mean under democratic domination. 47 Furthermore, the new chairman of
the Senate committee, Senator Hatch, was a strong supporter of program-specific
enforcement.
This change in the political configuration is represented in Figure 5 by the new
contract curve C(H,S 1 ), with E x representing the new long run equilibrium.
The Court is now before a divided Congress. Since the House has not changed, the
bargaining set is very small (not depicted in Figure 5 to avoid excessive clutter)
.
Thus, major legislation will not come out of that Congress. On the other hand, the
Senate will support any change in the status quo that the Supreme Court would like to
undertake
.
As predicted by the model, shortly thereafter, on 1981, the Court granted
certiorari to consider North Haven Board of Education v. Bell . 48 This case involved
the validity of Title IX regulations promulgated by the Department of Education.
These regulations prohibited federally funded education programs from employment sex
discrimination. Although the issue of the enforcement provision of Title IX was not
directly involved, North Haven gave an opportunity to the Court to signal its desire
to clarify the debate, by intervening directly, if necessary. In dicta, the Court
expressed its opinion to the fact that an examination of Title IX' s language, as well
as of its legislative history, corroborate a program- specific type of enforcement. 49
While the Court was struggling with the interpretation of Title IX, several bills
and resolutions were being introduced in Congress on the same issue. Apart from their
legislative purpose, these bills served to communicate to the Court the different
47 Id at p. 26.
48 456 U.S. 511(1982), cert, granted 450 U.S. 909(1981)
49 North Haven . 456 U.S. 511, 537.
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houses' preferences on this issue. 50
In Grove City the Court went on to make North Haven 's dicta the main ruling of
the case. Although deciding in favor of a broad triggering clause, i.e., that any
kind of financial aid even if given directly to students would trigger Title IX
coverage, the Court held that the enforcement provision of Title IX was intended to be
program-specific
.
As argued above, following a drastic change in the preferences of one of the
houses of Congress, the Senate on the case at hand, we would expect the Court to
intervene. The intervention of the Court would bring a new policy outcome which may
well be outside the bargaining area between the Senate and the House. In fact this is
the case with Grove City . Program- specific enforcement had been the kind of
enforcement Senator Hatch signaled to the Court as the Senate's preference. Although
the Court decided against a broad triggering clause, it sided with Hatch in the most
relevant issue. Thus, again, the Court followed the electorate. 51
Following Grove City several other bills were introduced both in support and
against the Court's decision. As predicted by our model, no legislation came out
50 In June 11, 1981, Senator Hatch, now Chairman of the Committee on Labor and
Human Resources, introduced S 1361 to reinforce the program-specific nature of Title
IX; to provide for a narrow triggering clause; to restrict the scope of the Act to
students; and, to include under the jurisdiction of the Act the admission process of
recipients. Senator Hatch seems to have had the Court in mind: "The amendment would
dispose of the issues in the Grove City College versus Harris case, currently on
litigation, in which the Department of Education has contended that Federal aid to a
student is sufficient by itself to subject to Title IX all the activities of whatever
school he or she decides to attend.", 127 Cong, rec S636 (daily ed. Jan. 24, 1981).
Two other bills were also introduced. SR 478 was introduced on September 22, 1982,
and HR 190 was introduced on May 10, 1983. It reported without amendment, with the
intention of signaling to the Court the House's preferences for institution-wide fund
termination.
1 It has been argued that the Court's decision in Grove City was in fact the
correct legal interpretation of Title IX. Garvey (1986) argues that program-specific
enforcement is the standard that better fits the rationale under which Congress
decided to forbid discriminatory practices by those receiving Federal aid.
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before the new Congress. 52
In 1986 the Democrats regained control of the Senate, while the Executive
remained Republican. It is reasonable to assume that the new position of the Senate
was almost identical to that of the House. Thus, the contract curve between the House
and the Senate collapses to point H-S 2 , with H—
S
2 becoming also the new long run
equilibrium.
After this drastic change in the political configuration of Congress our model
suggests that there should be an attempt by Congress to overturn Grove City . In fact
in 1987 Senator Kennedy introduced S. 557. The bill was similar in language and scope
to S. 431. It was introduced under the findings that the Supreme Court had "unduly
narrowed or cast doubt upon the broad application" of Title IX and therefore
legislative action is necessary to restore the institution wide application of Title
IX. 53 On January 28, 1988 the Senate voted favorably upon S. 557. The bill was
passed by a vote of 75-14. 5A The House approved the bill on March 2, 1988 by a vote
of 315-98. 55
From Figure 5 it is clear that under the new contract curve, Grove City . E lf is
not longer a long run equilibrium. The new long run equilibrium (S.557) is slightly
broader than the status quo before Grove City and must be located in the area to the
52 For example, S2363 (Feb. 28, 1984: to change "program or activity" to include
institution); S 2568 (April 12, 1984: to restore Title IX to its broad coverage in
enforcement); S 2910(August 7, 1984); S 3079(Oct. 5, 1984). S.431 and HR 700
(february 7, 1985: to restore the prior executive branch interpretation and broad,
institution wide application of Title IX); S. 272 (January 24, 1985, to require than
in the case of educational institutions, the phrase "program or activity" shall mean
the entire institution)
.
53 S. 557, enacting clause, 134 Cong. Rec . S266 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 1988).
5A Id.
55 134 Cong. REc. H 565 (daily ed. March 2, 1988).
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right of E . 56
To summarize, Grove City provides a good example of strategic behavior by the
Courts. In the same way as in State Farm , facing a divided Congress, the Court
chooses to intervene by obtaining support from one of the Houses of Congress (in State
Farm the House, in Grove City the Senate). Once Congress becomes unified again, the
Court does not try to maintain the status quo, and instead allows Congress to adjust
the legislative outcome.
V. Final Comments
This paper provides a micro -analytic model of Supreme Court statutory decisions, and
used to understand, in a consistent way, two major recent Supreme Court decisions.
These cases show how the Supreme Court responds to political changes.
In both cases the Supreme Court follows the electoral results by adjusting to the
changes in the composition of Congress and the Presidency. On the one hand, in State
Farm
, the Supreme Court acted to reverse an administrative policy which was
implemented following a change in both Congress and the President that, in the absence
of the Supreme Court, would have implied a drastic shift in regulatory policy. In
Grove City , however, the Supreme Court moved to make a new policy following a change
in the composition of the Senate. Such new policy would have not, in the absence of
the Supreme Court move, come out of Congress, since it would have been blocked by the
House of Representatives. In both cases the Supreme Court decisions were supported by
one of the houses of Congress, and thus, they could not be reversed by the then
The exact position of E2 will depend of the significance attached to the
Danforth amendment. (S. 557, 134 Cong. Rec . S266 (daily ed. Jan. 28,1988)). The
Danforth amendment provides that institutions receiving aid are not required to
provide or pay for abortions. The concern was that denial of abortion or related
services would be perceived as discrimination against women. Reports in the press (eg
New York Times, March 3, 1988) suggested that acceptance of the amendment led many
republicans to support the bill, giving Congress the supermajority needed to overturn
a possible Presidential veto.
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current Congress.
To summarize, we see in this paper the dual role that the Supreme Court can play.
On the one hand it can be seen as supporting the status quo, and restraining both the
President and Congress from undertaking a drastic regulatory change. On the other
hand, the Supreme Court played an activist role, by introducing a policy that changes
the status quo, even though Congress could not, by itself, legislate such policy
change. Thus, these two examples show that whether the Supreme Court is activist or
restrained will depend on the political circumstances. Following changes in Congress
that create legislative stalemate we would expect the Supreme Court to be activist.
On the other hand, following a large change in the Presidency we would expect the
Supreme Court to follow a restrained path.
24
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APPENDIX
BILLS INTRODUCED TO AMEND THE NTMV ACT OF 1966





















To amend the NTMV Act of 1966 to
require the installation of passive
restraint systems in small new cars
To amend the NTMV Act of 1966,
to require from all car
manufacturers the installation of
automatic crash protection systems
in new passenger cars
.
To amend the Internal Revenue Code
to encourage the use of airbags
,
allowing manufacturers to claim a
refundable tax credit for the
installation of airbags in 1984 and
beyond, and imposing an excise tax
on new cars without this technology.
To amend the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954 and the NTMV Act
of 1966 to expedite the
installation of automatic
safety airbags.
To enact the Highway Safety
Act of 1983.
To amend the NTMV Act of 1966
to provide for more extensive
use of safetybelt systems in
passenger motor vehicles , in
order to assist in reducing
health, dissability, and other
costs
To amend the NTMV Act of 1966
to require the provision of
automatic safety airbags in
all automobiles, beginning on
or after Sept. 1, 1986.
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